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Patricia Hatamyar Moore *
The effect of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on pleading standards and
behavior is a source of significant legal debate. This article
serves as a follow-up to Professor Moore's 2010 empirical
study on Iqbal's effect on courts' rulings on motions to dis-
miss complaints for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Professor
Moore's previous study found a statistically significant in-
crease in the likelihood that a court grants a 12(b)(6) motion
with leave to amend following Iqbal. In this article, Profes-
sor Moore updates and increases the pool of cases in her da-
tabase. The updated data reveals several empirical trends.
First, the current study finds a statistically significant in-
crease under Iqbal in the likelihood that a court will grant a
12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend, as compared to
denying the motion. Second, following Iqbal, courts are now
more likely to entirely dismiss cases through the grant of a
12(b)(6) motion. And third, the study confirms that constitu-
tional civil rights cases are particularly affected under the
courts' application of Iqbal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Judges, lawyers, academics, legislators, and law students have
collectively spent thousands of hours over the last two years pars-
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ing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,' debating whether it mandated a radical
change in federal pleading standards, and predicting its future
influence on rulings on motions to dismiss federal complaints un-
der Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.2 Some have also attempted to quantitatively measure
whether federal district court judges were less likely to grant
12(b)(6) motions under the old "no set of facts" standard set forth
in dictum in Conley v. Gibson' than under the new "plausibility"
standard introduced in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly4 and am-
plified in Iqbal.'
My prior empirical study of the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on
district court rulings found that district courts following Iqbal
granted 12(b)(6) motions in full with leave to amend at over three
times the rate (19%) of district courts following Conley (6%).6 Fur-
ther, the relative risk of a 12(b)(6) motion being granted with
leave to amend, compared to being denied, was four times greater
under Iqbal than under Conley, holding other potential factors
(such as the type of case) constant.
1. See 556 U.S. -, -, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
2. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6) ("[Tihe following defense] may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: ... failure to state a claim upon which relief can be grant-
ed. . . .").
3. See 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we
follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.").
4. See 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ("[W~e do not require heightened fact pleading of spe-
cifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."). As to
"plausible," Professor Epstein has stated, "Exactly what that elusive word means is still
up for grabs, but it does appear at the very least that this much is true: standards have
stiffened." Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and
Iqbal with Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 197 (2011).
5. Iqbal clarified that Twombly's plausibility standard applies to all civil cases, not
just antitrust cases. 129 S. Ct. at 1953. Iqbal also solidified the "two-pronged" approach to
12(b)(6) motions. Id. at 1950. First, a court should identify the "conclusions" in the com-
plaint and refuse to assume that those "conclusions" are true, as opposed to "factual" alle-
gations in the complaint, which the court must assume are true on a 12(b)(6) motion. Id. at
1949-50. The Court, however, did not explain how to distinguish a "conclusion" from a
"fact." Second, a court should then determine whether the "factual" allegations alone (dis-
regarding the "conclusions") state a claim to relief that is "plausible on its face." Id. at
1950. In applying the plausibility standard, the judge should use her 'judicial experience
and common sense." Id.
6. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading. Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empir-
ically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 598 tbl.1 (2010).
7. Id. at 619.
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This prior study used 1039 cases, including only 173 cases de-
cided in the three months after the Iqbal decision.! The present
study includes 460 different cases (not including the original 173)
decided in the twelve months after Iqbal, for a total of 1326 cases
in the database decided under Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal.' Part
II below outlines the research design of the updated study.
The larger database for this study yielded some interesting re-
sults suggesting that the impact of Iqbal has intensified since my
earlier study. The results of my updated study are presented in
Part III below.
For example, my last study found no statistically significant ef-
fect of either Twombly or Iqbal on the granting of 12(b)(6) mo-
tions without leave to amend." The updated results indicate that
the relative risk of a 12(b)(6) motion being granted without leave
to amend, compared to being denied, was expected to be 1.75
times greater under Iqbal than under Conley, holding all other
variables constant, and this increase is statistically significant.n
Further, my former study found that neither Twombly nor Iqbal
had a statistically significant effect on whether a case was entire-
ly dismissed upon the granting of a 12(b)(6) motion without leave
to amend." In this updated study, the odds of the case being en-
tirely dismissed upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion without leave
to amend were 1.71 times greater under Iqbal than under Con-
ley." Finally, the updated study continues to indicate that consti-
tutional civil rights cases in particular were dismissed at a higher
rate post-Iqbal than pre-Twombly.14
As explored in Part IV below, the results of the updated study
are roughly consistent with other publicly available studies." But
8. Id. at 585.
9. See infra Table 1.
10. Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 618 tbl.4.
11. See infra Table 3.
12. Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 622-23 tbl.5.
13. See infra Table 5.
14. See infra Tables 2, 4.
15. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY
SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 11-12 (2010) [hereinafter LEE &
WILLGING, ATTORNEY SATISFACTION] (discussing a survey of employment discrimination
attorneys, in which 94.2% of plaintiffs' attorneys indicated that they included more factual
allegations in their complaints since Twombly and Iqbal, and 74.6% said they had to re-
spond to motions to dismiss that might not have been filed before Twombly and Iqbal, but
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in March 2011 the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") released an
extensive empirical study ("FJC Study") of the possible effect of
Iqbal on 12(b)(6) motions." If read quickly and uncritically, the
FJC's overall conclusion, unlike mine, appears to be that Iqbal's
impact has been negligible, particularly when considering grants
of 12(b)(6) motions without leave to amend." Those defending Iq-
bal have been quick to spin the FJC Study as demonstrating that
the criticism of Iqbal has been premature and overblown." How-
ever, a careful analysis of the FJC Study, such as the one recently
completed by Professor Lonny Hoffman, reveals that "in every
case category examined there were more orders granting dismis-
sal post-Iqbal than there were pre-Twombly, both with and with-
only 7.2% reported having had a case dismissed for failure to state a claim under Twombly
and Iqbal); William M. Janssen, Iqbal "Plausibility" in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device
Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541, 598, 644 n.400 (2011) (showing that of 264 federal pharma-
ceutical and medical device cases, 21.2% were potentially, though not always fatally, im-
pacted by Iqbal); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 116-18 (2009)
(finding that in a study of 124 ADA cases in the federal district courts in the years before
and after Twombly, while 54.2% of motions to dismiss were granted in the year before
Twombly, 64.6% were granted in the year after Twombly); Kendall W. Hannon, Note,
Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on
12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1835-38 tbl.2 (2008) (finding that in cases
under Conley and in the seven months after Twombly, the granting of 12(b)(6) motions
increased from 36.8% under Conley to 39.4% under Twombly, but the difference was large-
ly explained by an increase in the granting of 12(b)(6) motions in civil rights cases under
Twombly). But see THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN
THEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWs ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL
LITIGATION 25 (2010), [hereinafter WILLGING & LEE, IN THEIR WORDS] (discussing tele-
phone interviews with thirty-five attorneys, in which "[m]ost interviewees indicated that
they had not seen any impact of [Twombly and Iqbal] in their practice").
16. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RULES (2011) [hereinafter FJC STUDY].
17. See id. at vii.
18. E.g., Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court's Recent Rul-
ings Will Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 2 (2011) (prepared statement of Andrew Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP), avail-
able at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/l1-6-29%2OPincus%2OTestimony.pdf ("Two years
ago, many asserted that the Court's ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal ... would dramatically re-
strict plaintiffs' access to court and that Congressional action was needed to overturn that
decision. That speculation has been proven wrong: an independent study of the effects of
the Iqbal ruling commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center-released just three months
ago-found 'no increase' in the rate at which motions to dismiss terminate a case and that
'[t]here was, in particular, no increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without
leave to amend in civil rights cases and employment discrimination cases."') (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). Cf. William H.J. Hubbard, The Problem of Measuring Legal
Change, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly 1 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin
Working Paper No. 575, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.Com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst
ract-id=1883831 (finding that "Twombly caused no legal change").
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out prejudice[,] . . . and it was more likely that a motion to dis-
miss would be granted.""
In Part V below, I explore the FJC Study, and venture that it
minimizes lqbal's impact in a variety of ways. First, I outline the
differences between the FJC's database and mine. Most critically,
the FJC's database omits pro se cases, which are disproportion-
ately civil rights cases,20 and which my previous study found were
more likely to be the subject of a successful 12(b)(6) motion under
Iqbal than under Conley.2 In addition, the FJC's database omits
all cases in which the 12(b)(6) motion was granted on the basis of
sovereign or qualified immunity;2 2 in other words, the FJC ex-
cluded the cases that were most like Iqbal itself. Finally, the
FJC's database (for studying the rulings on 12(b)(6) motions) is
limited to a six-month period pre-Twombly (January to June
2006) and a six-month period post-Iqbal (January to June 2010),
whereas my database contains cases running continuously for a
five-year period from May 22, 2005 to May 18, 2010.22
Next, I present comparative results, reached after attempting
to limit my database to more closely parallel the FJC's. Chiefly, I
omitted pro se cases from my database (as did the FJC) and, for
some purposes, limited my results to approximate the time peri-
ods the FJC used.24
With those limitations, my findings are broadly consistent with
the FJC's: both the FJC and I found that 34% of 12(b)(6) motions
were denied in 2006 (although my figure is for all of calendar year
2006, and the FJC's is only for the first six months of 2006). In
the first six months of 2010, the FJC found that the rate of denial
of 12(b)(6) motions had fallen to 25%; I found that the rate of de-
nial had fallen to 27%. Concomitantly, of course, that means that
19. Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal's Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Ju-
dicial Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss 6 (Univ. of Hous. Law Ctr., Paper No. 1904134,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1904134.
20. Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 613 (noting that although 28% of all plaintiffs in the
database were pro se, 50% of plaintiffs in civil rights cases were pro se).
21. Id. at 614 fig. 10, 629 tbl.C (noting that 67% and 85% of 12(b)(6) motions in pro se
cases were granted under Conley and Iqbal, respectively, with and without leave to amend
combined).
22. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 41.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Actually, my database ends one year after Iqbal, May 18, 2010, so it only contains
cases from roughly the first five months of 2010. In addition, I included all of the cases in
my database from 2006 so as to have a larger sample size.
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both studies found that the rate of granting 12(b)(6) motions, at
least in part, increased significantly from 2006 to 2010. Both
studies also found the increase in grants was primarily attributa-
ble to grants with leave to amend.
Setting aside for a moment the substance of the Iqbal findings,
the comparison of my delimited results with the FJC's tends to
weaken the oft-stated hypothesis that orders granting 12(b)(6)
motions are more likely to be "published" in computerized data-
bases such as Westlaw than orders denying 12(b)(6) motions. The
FJC was able to access district court orders that are not available
on computerized databases." At several points, then, the FJC
postulates that other researchers' inability to access such orders,
forcing them to rely on Westlaw, could have overstated the grant
rate found by those researchers (including me)." However, when I
excluded pro se plaintiffs and limited my database to roughly the
same time periods covered by the FJC's database, the two studies
found exactly the same denial rate in 2006 and only a two-
percentage-point difference in the denial rate in 2010-my denial
rate being two percentage points higher than the FJC's. This in-
dicates that district court orders ruling on 12(b)(6) motions in
Westlaw are fairly representative of the universe of all such dis-
trict court orders.
Returning to the substantive comparison between my results
and the FJC's, my results show a much greater impact of Iqbal
when I include all cases decided under Conley and Iqbal in my
database. The denial rate under Conley is still close-the FJC
found 34% of 12(b)(6) motions were denied in the first six months
of 2006," while I found 33% of motions were denied under Conley
from May 2005 to May 2007. However, as to orders granting all
relief sought by the 12(b)(6) motion, our results diverge. While
the FJC found that in the first six months of 2010 46% of the or-
ders granted all relief sought by the 12(b)(6) motion,28 I found 53%
of the orders granted all relief sought by the motion under Iqbal
25. FJC Study, supra note 16, at 5.
26. Id. at 1 n.4 (examining four studies by other researchers); id. at 2 (finding that
"each study was based on opinions appearing in the Westlaw database, which is likely to
overrepresent orders granting motions to dismiss when compared with orders appearing
on docket sheets"); id. at 21, 22, 36 (differentiating the FJC Study, which relied on cases
not appearing in computerized reference systems, from the four other studies).
27. Id. at 13.
28. Id. at 17 n.32.
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from May 2009 to May 2010-and that is still considering only
represented, not pro se, plaintiffs. When I add back the pro se
plaintiffs to the database, 46% of the 12(b)(6) motions were
granted in full under Conley, and 61% of the motions were grant-
ed in full under Iqbal.
To be sure, as noted by several researchers (including the FJC),
any study designed to empirically measure the impact of Iqbal
faces numerous challenges.2 9 Some potential litigants, perceiving
that the standard is more stringent, will choose not to file a case
at all. Other litigants may successfully plead with more particu-
larity to avoid being dismissed. In addition, 12(b)(6) motions are
granted for numerous reasons, not just on factual sufficiency
grounds, which are arguably the grounds most affected by
Twombly and Iqbal. It is frequently difficult to separate out or
characterize the exact reason for a dismissal, and I made no at-
tempt to do so, nor did the FJC." Finally, "a study comparing
grant rates pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal is unable to tell us how
many meritorious cases have been dismissed under the
TwomblylIqbal standard.""
Still, Iqbal's effect on federal pleading practice is undeniable.
Both the FJC's results and mine show that 12(b)(6) motions are
granted at a higher rate under Iqbal than under Conley.
II. STUDY DESIGN AND INCLUSION OF CASES IN UPDATED
DATABASE
For a detailed review of the design of the study, an explanation
of which cases were included and excluded from the database,
and the coding of the variables, please refer to my earlier article
on this topic.32 Precisely the same procedure was followed for this
update.
29. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 22-23; Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About
Twombly.Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1366 n.140 (2010); Hoffman, supra note
19, at 26-28.
30. For an interesting attempt to do exactly that for Iqbal's effect on employment and
housing discrimination cases, see Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of
New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY.
L.J. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1941294.
31. Hoffman, supra note 19, at 32 (emphasis added).
32. Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 584-96.
2012] 609
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Briefly, I chose, as randomly as possible, 1500 federal district
court cases involving 12(b)(6) motions for possible inclusion in the
database: 500 cases under Conley in the two years prior to the
Twombly decision,3 500 cases under Twombly in the two years
following the Twombly decision, and 500 under Iqbal in the one
year following the Iqbal decision." I excluded some of these 1500
cases from the database for various reasons. For example, I ex-
cluded those that did not actually involve a 12(b)(6) motion3 or
33. The Westlaw search in the U.S. District Courts Cases ("DCT') database for Conley
cases was as follows: ("12(b)(6)" "12(c)") & ("Conley" /2 "gibson") & "no set of facts" & da(aft
05/21/2005) & da(bef 05/22/2007). The same cases decided under Conley that were used in
my last study remained in the database for this study. It has been suggested that the for-
mulation of my Westlaw search for pre-Twombly cases (and analogously my search for
post-Twombly changes) may have had the effect of overstating the impact of Iqbal. Kevin
M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 821, 839 n.66 (2010). Because my pre-Twombly search included as search terms
"Conley" and "no set of facts" (the operative phrase of Conley v. Gibson that Twombly "re-
tired"), the search only turned up cases that at least cited (if not actually applied) that
very lenient standard. The concern is that other cases involving 12(b)(6) motions that did
not cite Conley and its "no set of facts" standard may have applied a tougher standard to
the complaint such that whatever tightening of the standard by Iqbal occurred, the net
effect would have seemed smaller. The point is logical, but I have several responses to it.
First, my choice of search terms was deliberate; whether there was a difference in results
based on the key language of the cases is exactly what I set out to study. Second, to my
knowledge, no one has actually studied how many pre-Twombly rulings on 12(b)(6) mo-
tions there were that did not, in fact, cite Conley v. Gibson. Because Conley was in the
pantheon of civil procedure and the federal litigation bar, I suspect such cases are in the
minority. Similarly, to my knowledge no one has studied whether there is any difference
in results pre-Twombly between cases that cited Conley and cases that did not. Again, no-
tice pleading and the "no set of facts" standard were so strongly engrained in the collective
understanding that I suspect any case that did not cite Conley cited something very much
like it, such as another leading Supreme Court case. E.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) ("[A] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no re-
lief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allega-
tions." (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Another possibility is that the case cited a court of appeals case from the
district court's circuit. E.g., Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 1992). Fi-
nally, we now have a modest basis for comparison of grant rates between orders that cited
Conley and the "no set of facts" standard in 2006 (mine) and orders that did not use those
search terms and were decided in the first six months of 2006 (the FJC's). Both studies
found that 34% of the 12(b)(6) motions were denied and 66% of the motions were granted
at least in part. See infra Table 7.
34. The Westlaw search in the DCT database for Twombly cases was as follows:
("12(b)(6)" "12(c)') & ("Twombly" /p "plausib!') & da(aft 05/21/2007) & da(bef 05/22/2009).
The same cases decided under Twombly that were used in my last study remained in the
database for this study.
35. I did not use the cases decided under Iqbal that were selected for my last study,
selecting instead 500 different cases. The new Westlaw search in the DCT database was:
("Ashcroft" /2 "Iqbal" & "12(b)(6)" & da(after 5/18/2009) & da(bef 5/19/2010)). This search
generated 5958 cases. Using a random number generator, I selected 500 of these cases, of
which 460 were ultimately included in the database.
36. See Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 586.
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were decided under an explicitly heightened pleading standard,"
such as Rule 9(b)" or the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA")." Similarly, it is important to note, for purposes of
comparison with the FJC Study, that although I included pro se
plaintiff cases generally, I excluded pro se cases that were decid-
ed in a procedural posture other than a 12(b)(6) motion or under a
standard that was not the default Rule 8(a)(2).
The updated database thus includes 1326 cases: 444 decided
under Conley, 422 decided under Twombly, and 460 decided un-
der Iqbal.
I coded the cases for these variables:
Authority: The Supreme Court authority under which the
12(b)(6) motion was decided. The categories are Conley, Twombly,
and Iqbal.
Circuit: The circuit within which the district court sits.
Judge Type: Whether a district court judge or a magistrate
judge wrote the opinion.
Pro Se Status: Whether the plaintiff was represented or pro se.
Class Action: Whether the case was brought as a class action
(whether or not it was actually certified as such).
Case Type: The nature of the suit. The thirteen categories of
suit are contracts; torts; constitutional civil rights; Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"); Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 ("ADA"); other civil rights (such as Title IX); Em-
ployment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"); Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA") and other labor; intellectual
property; antitrust; consumer credit; Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"); and other federal or state
statutes.40
37. Id. at 587.
38. FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) (stating that in alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake).
39. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(2) (2006) (requiring pleading with particularity in
private securities fraud actions); see Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 587 & nn.210-12.
40. For a detailed description of case types see Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 590-95.
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Ruling: The ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion. The categories are
(1) grant the entire motion without leave to amend, (2) grant the
entire motion with leave to amend, (3) grant the motion in part
and deny it in part (a "mixed ruling"), and (4) deny the entire mo-
tion.
Entire Case Dismissed: Whether the case was entirely dis-
missed upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion without leave to
amend, or whether some part of the case nevertheless remained
pending.
The last two variables are the outcome, or dependent, variables
that are the subject of this study. The first six variables are the
independent variables postulated to have some relationship to the
dependent variables. All calculations were performed in Stata."
Two major caveats about my database are in order. First, I
used only cases available on Westlaw, rather than searching all
district court orders on the prohibitively expensive and time-
consuming Public Access to Court Electronic Records ("PACER")
system. As indicated below, however, it does not appear that this
significantly affected the results. Second, the cases decided under
Iqbal span only one year, while the cases under Conley and
Twombly span two years each.
III. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF UPDATED DATABASE
A. Differences in Overall Rulings on 12(b)(6) Motions
Figure 1 and Table 1 show the percentage of rulings on 12(b)(6)
motions in the updated database under Conley, Twombly, and Iq-
bal.2
41. Stata is a commercially available statistical software package for data analysis,
data management, and graphics.
42. For ruling percentages with only represented plaintiffs, see infra Tables 2, 8, and
9.
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N=1326. Includes represented and pro se plaintiffs. See Table 1.
Table 1
Percentage of Rulings in Database on 12(b)(6) Motions under Conley,
Twombly, and Iqbal
(1326 cases between May 22, 2005 and May 18, 2010)
Frequency in database (Expected frequency)
Percent in database (95% confidence interval)
Grant, no Grant, Mixed Deny Total
amend amend
Conley 178 (177) 28(54) 123(117) 115(96) 444
40% (36- 6% (4- 28% (24- 26% (22-
45%) 9 %) 3 2 %) 3 0 %)
Twombly 165 (168) 37(52) 125 (111) 95(91) 422
39% (34- 9% (6- 30% (25- 23% (19-
44 %) 11 %) 34 %) 2 7 %)
Iqbal 184 (183) 97 (56) 102 (121) 77 (100) 460
40% (36- 21% (17- 22% (18- 17% (13-
44%) 25%) 26%) 20%)
Total 527 162 350 287 1326
40% 12% 26% 22%
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The percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted in full with leave to
amend increased from 6% under Conley to 9% under Twombly to
21% under Iqbal. The percentage of motions denied (i.e., plaintiff
won the motion) fell from 26% under Conley to 23% under
Twombly to 17% under Iqbal. The increase from Conley to Iqbal
in grants with leave to amend is statistically significant (p <
0.001), as is the decrease from Conley to Iqbal in denials (p <
0.001).
If we total the motions that were granted in full, both with and
without leave to amend, a full 61% of the motions in the database
were granted under Iqbal, as compared to 46% under Conley. The
increase, though, is due to the increase in grants of motions with
leave to amend under Iqbal.
This raises two obvious questions: do plaintiffs given leave to
amend actually amend, and, if so, do their amended complaints
survive any subsequent 12(b)(6) motions? If plaintiffs go on to
amend their complaints and survive further motions to dismiss,
then the increase in grants with leave to amend under Iqbal is
not troubling and may enhance litigation efficiency by sharpening
the issues in the case at an early stage.
If, on the other hand, most plaintiffs either do not amend or
amend only to be dismissed once more, this time with prejudice,
then the increase in grants with leave to amend under Iqbal may
continue to cause concern that Iqbal is impeding access to justice.
The FJC Study promises, in a future study, to examine the even-
tual fate of 12(b)(6) motions that have been granted with leave to
amend."'
B. Differences in Case Types
1. Distribution of Case Types in Database under Conley and
Iqbal
Figure 2 shows the percentage of different case types in the da-
tabase. Appendix A provides the exact frequencies and percent-
ages, broken down by represented and pro se plaintiffs.
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As shown in Figure 2, constitutional civil rights cases are the
most prevalent case type in the database, comprising 30.5% of the
overall 12(b)(6) motions (including the cases under Tworably,
which are not pictured above). There are 141 constitutional civil
rights cases under Conley (32% of the cases decided under Con-
ley), 135 constitutional civil rights cases under Twombly (32% of
the Twombly cases), and 124 such cases under Iqbal (27% of the
Iqbal cases). The next most frequent case type-other federal and
state statutes--comprises about 14% of the database, less than
half the number of constitutional civil rights cases.
Constitutional civil rights cases are also by far the most likely
to be brought by a pro se plaintiff. Figure 3 shows the percentage
of cases in the database brought pro se by case type.
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0 20 40 60
Percentage of pro se cases
N=1 307. Includes cases under Conley, Twombly, and lqbal.
As Figure 3 shows, civil rights cases of all types-constitutional
civil rights, Title VII, ADA/ADEA, and other civil rights-have a
higher proportion of pro se plaintiffs than other case types. The
overall average of pro se plaintiffs in the database is 29%.44 Under
Conley, 56% of the constitutional civil rights cases in the database
were brought by pro se plaintiffs (78 of 140 cases). Under Iqbal,
57% of the constitutional civil rights cases in the database were
brought by pro se plaintiffs (71 of 124 cases). There was only one
antitrust case in the database brought pro se. ERISA/FLSA cases
had the next lowest percentage: only 2.9% of such plaintiffs were
pro se.
The database includes constitutional civil rights cases filed pro
se by prisoners. Note, however, that I excluded pro se complaints
44. This percentage is higher than the overall percentage of pro se litigants in federal
district court, which was 26.5% in fiscal year 2008. See Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 613
n.271 (citing JAMES C. DUFF, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 780 tbl.S-23 (2008)).
45. Throughout this article, slight variations in totals result from an inability to clas-
sify some cases in a particular manner-here, pro se status-based solely on the written
order in question. The unclassifiable cases are not included in totals relating to the classi-
fication.
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that were dismissed under a standard different from that of Rule
8(a)(2).46 Only cases challenged by a 12(b)(6) motion and subject to
the default pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2) were included in
the database."
I did not code the cases for prisoner plaintiffs, but I did code
the cases for pro se plaintiffs. Since most cases filed by prisoners
invoke constitutional civil rights, and since most prisoners file pro
se, "constitutional civil rights cases brought pro se" articulates an
imperfect proxy for prisoner cases. The database contains 224
constitutional civil rights cases brought pro se and 172 constitu-
tional civil rights cases brought by represented plaintiffs.
2. Differences in Rulings by Case Type
Figure 4 and Table 2 show the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions
in the database that were granted in full, both with and without
leave to amend, for represented plaintiffs only, by the most preva-
lent case types.
Figure 4
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Percentage of motions granted in full
Grant amend Grant no amend
N=565. Certain case types excluded ue to small number. See Table 2.
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2006) (outlining the dismissal of sua sponte reviews of
prisoners' complaints under the PLRA); id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (describing the dismissal of
complaints in proceedings in forma pauperis); see also Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 585
(demonstrating that I excluded the same under my prior study).
47. See Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 588, 594 (demonstrating that to maintain continu-
ity, I only included the same types of cases in both studies).
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Table 2
Deny Mixed Grant amend Grant no Total
amend
Conley Igbal Conley Igbal Conley Igbal Conley Iqbal Conley Iqbal
Contract 35% 26% 40% 18%* 4% 30%* 21% 25%
(17) (16) (19) (11) (2) (18) (10) (15) (48) (60)
Tort 30% 30% 35% 27% 12% 15% 23% 27%
(20) (10) (23) (9) (8) (5) (15) (9) (66) (33)
Intellectual 78% 40%** 0% 27%** 0% 7% 22% 27%
prop. (7) (6) (0) (4) (0) (1) (2) (4) (9) (15)
Const. civ. 21% 9%** 37% 26% 6% 19%** 35% 45%
rights (13) (5) (23) (14) (4) (10) (22) (24) (62) (53)
Title VII 27% 39% 55% 22%** 0% 17% 18% 22%
(3) (7) (6) (4) (0) (3) (2) (4) (11) (18)
ERISA/FLSA 47% 23%** 16% 17% 0% 17%** 37% 43%
(9) (7) (3) (5) (0) (5) (7) (13) (19) (30)
Consumer 43% 5%* 21% 23% 0% 36%* 36% 36%
credit (6) (1) (3) (5) (0) (8) (5) (8) (14) (22)
Other 35% 22% 24% 32% 7% 12% 35% 34%
statutes (16) (13) (11) (19) (3) (7) (16) (20) (46) (59)
Total 33% 22%* 32% 24%** 6% 20%* 29% 33%
(91) (65) (88) (71) (17) (57) (79) (97) (275) (290)
Note: Excludes case types coded as ADA/ADEA, Other Civil Rights, LMRA/other labor, Antitrust, and
RICO, as numbers in these cells were small.
*Difference in proportions from Conley to Iqbal is significant at p < 0.01.
**Difference in proportions from Conley to Iqbal is significant at p < 0.05.
Even excluding pro se cases, the percentage of motions granted
in full (both with and without leave to amend) rose from Conley to
Iqbal in every major type of case. To be sure, some of the rate in-
creases are not statistically significant (at p < 0.05). The rate in-
creases that are statistically significant-in contracts, constitu-
tional civil rights, ERISA, and consumer credit cases--can
attribute much of their increase to grants with leave to amend.
Still, whether statistically significant or not, the rate of grants in
full without leave to amend in cases with represented plaintiffs
increased from Conley to Iqbal in most major case types (except
for consumer credit and "other statutes").
In constitutional civil rights cases, even excluding pro se plain-
tiffs, courts granted 12(b)(6) motions at a higher-than-average
rate under Iqbal. Overall, under Iqbal, courts granted in full
without leave to amend 33% of the 12(b)(6) motions in cases with
represented plaintiffs, but in constitutional civil rights cases,
courts granted 45% (24 of 53) of the motions without leave to
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amend. In addition, under Iqbal, courts granted in full with leave
to amend 19% (10 of 53) of the motions in constitutional civil
rights cases with represented plaintiffs. Combining grants in full
with and without leave to amend means courts granted 64% of
the 12(b)(6) motions in the database in constitutional civil rights
cases under Iqbal, even when the plaintiff was represented by
counsel. Comparatively, under Conley, courts granted in full 41%
of the motions in constitutional civil rights cases with represented
plaintiffs (35% without and 6% with leave to amend).
C. Regression of Various Factors on 12(b)(6) Ruling
The results above were presented in two-way tables or figures.8
The multinomial logistic regression is a more appropriate statis-
tical tool with which to gauge Iqbal's possible effect on the ruling
on a 12(b)(6) motion. A multinomial logistic regression tests the
strength of a model's various independent variables in predicting
the outcome, or dependent variable, when the dependent variable
is categorical rather than linear. This regression model estimates
"the probability of different alternatives relative to the probabil-
ity of a baseline."4 9
In the regression presented in this part, the dependent variable
is the ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion. The ruling is a categorical
variable: the outcome possibilities are deny in full, mixed ruling
(granted in part and denied in part), grant in full with leave to
amend, and grant in full without leave to amend. I used "deny"
(the best outcome for the plaintiff) as the baseline outcome with
which to compare the other outcomes.
The independent variables, or possible predictors, used in this
model were Authority (Conley, Twombly, or Iqbal), Circuit, Judge
Type, Pro Se Status, Class Action, and Case Type."o
48. As I warned earlier, "[Miultiple factors may affect the ruling on the 12(b)(6) mo-
tion, and two-way tables cannot account for any confounding effects of other variables. As
presented in two-way tables, any apparent relationships between the independent varia-
bles and outcomes can be misleading." Id. at 597 (citation omitted).
49. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 608 (2007).
50. Dummy (or "design" or "indicator") variables were created for Authority, Circuit,
and Case Type. See DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOw, APPLIED LOGISTIC
REGRESSION 62 (2000) ("[D]iscrete nominal scale variables are included properly into the
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Table 3 presents the results of this regression for all plaintiffs
(both represented and pro se)."
Table 3
Multinomial Logistic Regression on Rulings on 12(b)(6) Motions in
Database of 1340 Motions Decided Between May 22, 2005 and May 18, 2010
All plaintiffs (represented and pro se)
Ruling outcome
Grant in full without leave to amend, Grant in full with leave to amend,
as compared with deni, as compared with deny
Relative Standard z p Relative Standard z p
Risk Error Risk Error
Ratio Ratio
Twombly I 1.35 0.26 1.52 0.128 1.84 0.56 2.02 0.043*
Iqbal 1 1.75 0.35 2.81 0.005* 6.03 1.67 6.48 <0.001*
Pro se plntffl 5.46 1.36 6.84 <0.001* 3.62 1.11 4.19 <0.001*
Class action 1 0.60 0.17 -1.77 0.077 0.59 0.24 -1.31 0.189
Judge type I 0.93 0.32 -0.22 0.824 1.07 0.44 0.17 0.864
First Cir I 3.15 1.57 2.31 0.021* 0.73 0.56 -0.41 0.680
Second Cir I 3.62 1.31 3.55 <0.001* 2.91 1.34 2.32 0.020*
Third Cir I 1.94 0.71 1.82 0.069 1.20 0.58 0.39 0.699
Fourth Cir I 2.44 1.03 2.11 0.035* 1.62 0.87 0.89 0.374
Fifth Cir | 1.89 0.73 1.64 0.101 0.76 0.44 -0.48 0.632
Sixth Cir I 3.60 1.33 3.46 0.001* 0.53 0.33 -1.04 0.300
Seventh Cir I 1.55 0.60 1.12 0.263 0.58 0.34 -0.93 0.354
Eighth Cir I 1.79 0.77 1.35 0.177 1.62 0.91 0.85 0.393
Ninth Cir I 3.38 1.21 3.40 0.001* 4.99 2.19 3.67 <0.001*
Tenth Cir I 3.29 1.51 2.60 0.009* 1.47 0.91 0.62 0.534
D.C. Cir I 7.92 4.56 3.59 <0.001* 2.07 1.72 0.87 0.383
Tort I 1.30 0.40 0.85 0.393 1.87 0.75 1.55 0.121
Intell prop I 0.54 0.24 -1.39 0.164 0.29 0.20 -1.77 0.076
Const civ rtsl 2.16 0.63 2.64 0.008* 2.00 0.77 1.82 0.069
Title VII 1 0.90 0.36 -0.27 0.786 1.27 0.65 0.46 0.645
ADA/ADEA 1 1.71 0.90 1.02 0.308 2.10 1.50 1.04 0.300
Other civ rtsl 2.06 0.99 1.50 0.134 1.09 0.71 0.13 0.894
ERISA/FLSA I 1.33 0.50 0.75 0.451 1.09 0.57 0.16 0.875
LMRA/oth lab I 1.28 0.66 0.47 0.637 0.29 0.33 -1.09 0.275
Antitrust I 1.67 1.35 0.63 0.528 3.75 3.16 1.57 0.117
Consum creditl 1.78 0.75 1.38 0.168 1.71 0.88 1.05 0.295
RICO 1 1.43 0.91 0.56 0.578 2.29 1.78 1.07 0.285
Othr statutesl 1.92 0.57 2.19 0.028* 1.07 0.45 0.17 0.867
* Significant at the 95% confidence level or higher.
Notes: Number of observations = 1304. "Deny" is the baseline outcome to which
other ruling outcomes are compared. The ruling category "mixed" is not shown.
The reference outcome for Authority is Conley; for Pro Se Plaintiff, a represent-
ed plaintiff; for Class Action, not a class action; for Judge Type, a district court
judge; for Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit; and for Case Type, contract. For this
model, LR chi2(84) = 334.22; p < 0.001; Log likelihood = -1539.99; and Pseudo
R2 = 0.10.
[logistic] analysis only when they have been recoded into design variables."). Judge Type,
Pro Se Status, and Class Action are already binary variables (variables that have only two
outcome categories).
51. The outcome possibility "mixed ruling" as compared to "deny" is not included. The-
se results are available from the author upon request.
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My earlier study found no statistically significant difference in
the relative risk of a 12(b)(6) motion being granted without leave
to amend, as compared to being denied, under Conley, Twombly,
or Iqbal.52 In the updated database, though, Iqbal has become a
statistically significant factor. Under Iqbal, the relative risk that
a court would grant a 12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend, ra-
ther than deny, increased by a factor of 1.75 over Conley, holding
all other variables constant. 53 At the 95% confidence level, this
relative risk ratio could be as low as 1.18 or as high as 2.57.
Further, the updated database continues to show Iqbal's im-
pact on the granting of 12(b)(6) motions with leave to amend. Un-
der Iqbal, holding all other variables constant, the relative risk
that a court would grant a 12(b)(6) motion with leave to amend,
rather than deny, increased by a factor of 6.03 over Conley-six
times more likely. At the 95% confidence level, this could be as
low as 3.5 times or as high as 10.38 times more likely under Iqbal
than Conley.
Keep in mind that the regression shown in Table 3 indicates
the potential impact of Iqbal holding all other independent varia-
bles-such as Pro Se Status-constant. Thus, the relative risk of
a 12(b)(6) motion being granted, as compared to denied, increased
under Iqbal regardless of the plaintiffs pro se status.
As in my previous study, variables other than Iqbal also have a
significant effect on courts granting 12(b)(6) motions without
leave to amend, as compared to denying such motions. Holding all
other variables constant, the relative risk that a 12(b)(6) motion
would be granted without leave to amend, as compared to denied,
by district courts sitting in the First, Second, Sixth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits is over three times that of district courts sitting in
the Eleventh Circuit." In the District of Columbia, holding all
other variables constant, the relative risk that a court grants a
52. Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 620.
53. A value greater than 1.0 for the relative risk ratio for any variable indicates that
the presence of that variable (holding all other variables constant) increases the relative
risk that the outcome possibility (here, grant without leave to amend) will occur, compared
to the baseline outcome (here, deny).
54. In district courts sitting in the First Circuit, the relative risk ratio is 3.30; in the
Second Circuit, 3.45; in the Sixth Circuit, 3.76; in the Ninth Circuit, 3.5; and in the Tenth
Circuit, 3.43. In district courts sitting in the Fourth Circuit, holding all other variables
constant, the relative risk that a 12(b)(6) motion would be granted without leave to
amend, as compared to denied, is 2.46 times that of the Eleventh Circuit.
2012]1 621
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
motion without leave to amend, as compared to denying the mo-
tion, is 8.21 times that of district courts sitting in the Eleventh
Circuit.
Some case types are also significant predictors of the ruling.
The relative risk that a 12(b)(6) motion would be granted without
leave to amend, as compared to denied, in a case type involving
"other federal and state statutes" is expected to be 1.92 times that
of a contract case, holding all other variables constant. In a con-
stitutional civil rights case, this relative risk is expected to be
2.16 times that of a contract case; at the 95% confidence level,
this could be as low as 1.22 or as high as 3.84.
Finally, holding all other variables constant, the relative risk
that a 12(b)(6) motion would be granted without leave to amend,
as compared to denied, in a case with a pro se plaintiff is over five
times that of a case with a represented plaintiff.
D. Regression Focusing on Constitutional Civil Rights and Pro se
Plaintiffs
Motions to dismiss constitutional civil rights cases, and mo-
tions to dismiss pro se plaintiffs' complaints, are disproportion-
ately successful under any authority." Does Iqbal make it even
more difficult for such cases to survive the pleadings stage?
Table 4 presents another way to examine Iqbal's potential im-
pact on constitutional civil rights cases. It presents the results of
a multinomial logistic regression using only the 396 constitution-
al civil rights cases in the database.56 The district court's ruling
on the 12(b)(6) motion is again the dependent variable. Due to the
smaller number of cases in this subset of the database, the only
independent variables used in the model were Authority (Conley,
Twombly, or Iqbal) and Pro Se Status.
55. See supra Part III(B); see also Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 614, figs.9 & 10. As to
pro se plaintiffs generally, see the following: 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006); Nina Ingwer Van
Wormer, Help at Your Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro se Phenom-
enon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983 (2007) and Rory K. Schneider, Comment, Illiberal Construction
of Pro se Pleadings, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 585 (2011).
56. The figure differs slightly from the 405 total constitutional civil rights cases in the
database because not all cases indicated whether or not the claim was brought pro se.
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Table 4
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Authority and
Pro Se Status on Ruling
(Includes Only Constitutional Civil Rights Cases, Both
Pro Se and Represented)





Twombly I 1.71 0.67 1.36 0.175
Iqbal I 2.02 1.00 1.43 0.154
Pro se pl I 1.05 0.37 0.13 0.898
-+----+------------------------------------------------
Grant amend I
Twombly I 3.57 2.05 2.23 0.026*
Iqbal I 14.06 8.50 4.37 <0.001*
Pro se pl I 2.08 0.90 1.69 0.091
-+---------------------------------------------------
Grant no amndl
Twombly 1 1.73 0.66 1.43 0.152
Iqbal I 3.77 1.76 2.85 0.004*
Pro se pl I 2.16 0.73 2.28 0.022*
* Significant at the 95% confidence level or higher.
Notes: Number of observations = 396. Deny is the baseline outcome category for
Ruling. Conley is the baseline for Authority. A represented plaintiff is the base-
line for Pro se Plaintiff. In this model, LR chi2(9) = 41.72; p < 0.001; Log likeli-
hood = -462.44; and Pseudo R2 = 0.04.
Table 4 shows that in constitutional civil rights cases courts
were 3.77 times more likely to grant motions to dismiss in full
without leave to amend, as compared to deny, under Iqbal than
under Conley-regardless of the plaintiffs pro se status. At a 95%
confidence level, this could be as low as 1.51 times or as high as
9.39 times more likely under Iqbal than under Conley.
The strength of Iqbal's relationship to grants in full with leave
to amend is even higher. In civil rights cases, courts were four-
teen times more likely to grant motions to dismiss with leave to
amend, as compared to deny, under Iqbal than under Conley-
again, holding the pro se factor constant.
Finally, in a constitutional civil rights case, the relative risk
that a court grants a 12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend
against a pro se plaintiffs complaint, as compared to deny, was
2.16 times higher than a represented plaintiffs. That increase in
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relative risk was regardless of the authority under which the mo-
tion was decided.
E. Whether the Grant of a 12(b)(6) Motion Contributes to the
Entire Case's Dismissal
Even if a 12(b)(6) motion is granted in full without leave to
amend, part of the case could still remain pending-for example,
a different count or a claim against a different defendant. Thus, I
coded the cases in the database for whether the grant of a 12(b)(6)
motion without leave to amend resulted in a dismissal of the en-
tire case (no part of the case remains pending after the grant of
the 12(b)(6) motion)." My last study found that the rate of dis-
missing entire cases upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion did not
change significantly from Conley to Twombly to Iqbal. The updat-
ed database reveals a significantly higher percentage of entire
cases being dismissed on the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion under Iq-
bal than was the case under Conley.
Using all cases in the database, 120 of 443 cases (27%) under
Conley, 101 of the 420 cases (24%) under Twombly, and 143 of the
460 cases (35%) under Iqbal were entirely dismissed upon the
grant of a 12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend. Using only the
subset of 510 cases in the database in which the court granted a
12(b)(6) motion in full without leave to amend, the percentage of
cases that were entirely dismissed rose from 67% (118 of 177) un-
der Conley to 76% (139 of 183) under Iqbal."
A logistic regression" of factors that might be related to wheth-
er the entire case was dismissed suggests that Iqbal, as compared
to Conley, is expected to significantly raise the odds that a case
will be entirely dismissed on the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion with-
out leave to amend. Table 5 presents the results.
57. Sometimes the dismissal of the case occurs because of a combination of motions
being granted, such as a 12(b)(6) motion as to some counts and a summary judgment mo-
tion as to other counts. I counted the order as an entire dismissal if the grant of the
12(b)(6) motion was without leave to amend and contributed to the dismissal.
58. The increase in the rate at which entire cases were dismissed from Conley to Iqbal
is statistically significant at p = 0.03.
59. The logistic regression model is similar to the multinomial logistic regression
model, except that in logistic regression, the outcome variable is binary (i.e., has only two
outcome possibilities). Here, the outcome variable-whether a case is entirely dismissed
upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion-is binary (entire case dismissed or entire case not
dismissed).
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Table 5
Logistic Regression of Various Factors on Whether the Entire Case Was
Dismissed (Includes 510 Cases in Which Motion Was Granted in Full
without Leave to Amend)
I Odds Ratio Std. Err. z p
-+------- ----- -- --------------------------------------
Twombly I 0.82 0.22 -0.74 0.459
Iqbal 1 1.71 0.45 2.03 0.043*
Pro se plntffl 3.51 0.87 5.07 <0.001*
Class action I 3.95 2.16 2.51 0.012*
Judge type I 0.83 0.34 -0.46 0.646
First Cir I 1.93 1.36 0.94 0.349
Second Cir I 3.07 1.71 2.01 0.044*
Third Cir I 2.02 1.14 1.25 0.213
Fourth Cir I 1.36 0.83 0.51 0.608
Fifth Cir I 1.19 0.71 0.29 0.771
Sixth Cir I 1.32 0.72 0.52 0.606
Seventh Cir I 0.58 0.35 -0.90 0.370
Eighth Cir I 1.13 0.74 0.19 0.853
Ninth Cir I 2.67 1.49 1.75 0.080
Tenth Cir 1 0.91 0.56 -0.15 0.882
D.C. Cir I 3.18 2.15 1.71 0.088
Tort 1 0.27 0.13 -2.77 0.006*
Intell prop I 0.70 0.52 -0.47 0.635
Const civ rtsl 0.99 0.40 -0.04 0.972
Title VII I 1.12 0.68 0.18 0.857
ADA/ADEA I 0.58 0.38 -0.82 0.412
Other civ rtsl 0.84 0.51 -0.28 0.776
ERISA/FLSA I 1.23 0.74 0.35 0.726
LMRA/oth lab I 1.49 1.16 0.48 0.634
Antitrust I 1.79 2.28 0.46 0.647
Consum creditl 0.60 0.33 -0.92 0.356
RICO I 0.40 0.37 -0.98 0.329
Othr statutesl 0.80 0.35 -0.52 0.603
* Significant at the 95% confidence level or higher.
Notes: Number of observations = 510. The dependent variable is whether the
case was entirely dismissed upon the motion's grant (no part of the case re-
mained pending). The independent variables are shown in the left column. For
binary variables, represented plaintiffs, non-class actions, and district court
judges were the reference categories. For indicator variables, district courts in
the Eleventh Circuit were used as the reference category for Circuit and con-
tract cases were used as the reference category for Case Type. For this model,
LR chi2(28) = 89.27; p < 0.001; Log likelihood = -274.92; and Pseudo R2 = 0.14.
Of 510 rulings of "grant without leave to amend" in the data-
base, all other factors held constant, the odds of a dismissal of the
entire case were 1.71 times greater under Iqbal than under Con-
ley, and this is statistically significant at a 95.7% confidence level.
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At the 95% confidence level, the odds ratio could be as low as 1.02
or as high as 2.88. Again, the increase in the odds ratio under Iq-
bal occurred regardless of the plaintiffs pro se status.
Factors other than Iqbal were also significant predictors of
whether a case would be entirely dismissed upon the grant of a
12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend. First, cases with pro se
plaintiffs were 3.5 times more likely to be entirely dismissed upon
the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion than cases with represented plain-
tiffs. At the 95% confidence level, this rate could be as low as 2.2
or as high as 5.8. Second, interestingly, class actions (putative or
certified) were almost four times more likely to be entirely dis-
missed than non-class actions. Third, the district courts in the
Second Circuit were over three times more likely to dismiss the
entire case upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion than the district
courts in the Eleventh Circuit. Finally, tort cases were less likely
(by a factor of 0.27) to be entirely dismissed upon the granting of
a 12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend than contract cases.
IV. EARLY STUDIES OF IQBAL REQUESTED BY THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
Responding to the controversy ignited by Iqbal, the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules has requested several studies of Iqbal's
possible effect on federal civil practice. Two of the early studies
are discussed below.o
A. Qualitative Study of Appellate (and Some District Court)
Cases Interpreting Iqbal
Andrea Kuperman, the Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee A.
Rosenthal of the Southern District of Texas, compiled a summary
of approximately 100 federal appellate court cases as of July 26,
2010, applying Iqbal to review district court rulings on 12(b)(6)
motions ("Kuperman Memorandum").6' The Kuperman Memo-
60. See LEE & WILLGING, ATTORNEY SATISFACTION, supra note 15; WILLGING & LEE,
IN THEIR WORDS, supra note 15.
61. See Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Hon. Lee A.
Rosenthal, to Civil Rules & Standing Rules Comms. (July 26, 2010), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal_me mo_072610.pdf [hereinafter
Kuperman Memorandum]. Judge Rosenthal is the Chair of the Judicial Conference Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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randum reveals that the appellate courts affirm most 12(b)(6)
dismissals under Iqbal. Of approximately seventy-nine appeals
court cases cited in the memorandum in which the district court
had granted a 12(b)(6) motion, fifty-eight cases (73%) were af-
firmed on appeal." Only fifteen of those seventy-nine dismissals
(15%) were reversed on appeal." Of the five cases cited in the
memorandum in which the district court had denied the 12(b)(6)
motion, two (40%) were reversed and three (60%) were reversed
in part.
In addition, forty-six of the seventy-nine district court dismis-
sals (58%) involved some sort of civil rights case, such as constitu-
tional civil rights, employment discrimination, or housing dis-
crimination. Of those forty-six civil rights dismissals, thirty-four
(74%) were affirmed on appeal, six (13%) were affirmed in part
and reversed in part, and six (13%) were reversed.
Of the thirty-one district court rulings summarized in the Ku-
perman Memorandum (most dating from 2009), thirteen motions
(42%) were granted without leave to amend, six motions (19%)
were granted with leave to amend, five motions (16%) were
granted in part and denied in part, and seven motions (23%) were
denied. Although Ms. Kuperman does not appear to have selected
her cases randomly, and the sample is small, these findings are
roughly consistent with mine.64
Civil rights cases comprise 74% (23 of 31) of the district court
rulings summarized in the Kuperman Memorandum." Of those
twenty-three cases in which a 12(b)(6) motion was ruled upon, ten
motions (43%) were granted without leave to amend, four motions
62. See id. These figures summarize Ms. Kuperman's memorandum as of July 26,
2010. I did not include cases decided under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Rule 9(b), or the PSLRA, or
motions for leave to amend or motions to quash. All calculations in text are mine and do
not appear in Ms. Kuperman's memorandum. Ms. Kuperman's memorandum has been
updated to include cases decided after the time period I studied for this article, but the
later cases are not included in my calculations. See Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman,
Rules Law Clerk to Hon. Lee A. Rosenthal, to Civil Rules & Standing Rules Comms. (Dec.
15, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ruleslqbal-me
mo_121510.pdf.
63. The remaining nine dismissals (11%) were affirmed in part and reversed in part.
See Kuperman Memorandum, supra note 61.
64. Compare supra Table 1 (showing that of 460 motions to dismiss in this database
decided under Iqbal, 40% were granted without leave to amend, 21% were granted with
leave to amend, 22% were granted in part and denied in part, and 17% were denied), with
Kuperman Memorandum, supra note 61.
65. See Kuperman Memorandum supra note 61.
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(17%) were granted with leave to amend, five motions (22%) were
granted in part and denied in part, and four motions (17%) were
denied. Again, these findings are roughly consistent with mine
despite the lack of randomness and small size of Ms. Kuperman's
sample.
Of course, no case cited in the Kuperman Memorandum pre-
dates 2009, so a comparison of the frequency of 12(b)(6) dismis-
sals before 2009, or affirmances of same, is not possible without
additional research."
B. Administrative Office Statistics on Motions to Dismiss
In the aftermath of Twombly and Iqbal, the Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts ("AO") undertook a statistical
study of the frequency of and rulings on all motions to dismiss
under Rule 12(b), beginning in January 2007 (four months before
Twombly) and (as of this writing) ending at September 2010
(eighteen months after Iqbal)., The AO study provides useful in-
formation, but it was an imperfect assessment of the effect of
Twombly and Iqbal for at least three reasons.
First, the AO study did not segregate 12(b)(6) motions; it in-
cluded motions to dismiss filed under all subsections of Rule
12(b)." Although Twombly and Iqbal are now applied to some
12(b)(1) motions-motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction-it does not appear that the cases are being used in
motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5),
or 12(b)(7)." In particular, motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) proliferate and are unlikely to be
granted as frequently as 12(b)(6) motions.o Second, the AO study
66. See id. at 1-2.
67. STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MOTIONS To DISMIss:
INFORMATION ON COLLECTION OF DATA http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPoli
cies/rules/Motions%20to%2ODismiss%2OStatistics%20-%200ctober%202010.pdf (last visit-
ed Dec. 12, 2011) [hereinafter MOTIONS To DISMIss]. The AO has now posted a note that
because the FJC has published its study, the AO is no longer studying this issue. Notice
on Motion to Dismiss Data Provided by the Administrative Office, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. CouRTs http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/NoticeRegarding-
Collection ofMotion to Dismiss_- Data.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
68. MOTIONS TO DISMISS, supra note 67.
69. See generally Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iq-
bal, and the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN L. REV. 905, 908, 910 (2010).
70. See Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L.
REV. 1, 26, 29-30 (1998) (discussing a study of motions to dismiss for lack of personal ju-
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did not distinguish between grants of motions with leave to
amend and grants without leave to amend." Third, and most im-
portantly, the AO data included all filed 12(b) motions to dismiss,
but it did not include the dispositions of a large number of these
motions.7 2 As the AO explained, "[t]he courts do not rule on a sig-
nificant number of motions to dismiss, often because the case set-
tles without court intervention."
An example will illustrate the extent of the lack-of-disposition
problem with the AO data. For the entire time period (January
2007 to September 2010), the AO reported a total of 309,366 filed
motions to dismiss." However, in the same time period, the AO
reported only 116,041 motions granted; 43,499 denied; 14,504
mooted; and 17,646 granted in part and denied in part, for a total
of 191,690 motions on which there was some disposition report-
ed.7 ' Even though the motions filed were probably not exactly the
same motions that were disposed of, the 117,676 missing cases
could not all be due to a time lag.
Despite these problems with the AO data, some general trends
may still be discerned. Using the AO's published data, I created
some graphs that are somewhat easier to read.
Figure 5 shows that the number of motions to dismiss filed
roughly tracks the number of cases filed. Thus, any increase in
the filing of motions to dismiss may not mean that defendants are
emboldened by Twombly and Iqbal, just that there were more
complaints to challenge. Civil filings in the federal district courts
increased by 2% from 2009 to 2010.76
risdiction from 1970 to 1994 and finding that such motions were denied in federal court
approximately 50-60% of the time).
71. MOTIONS TO DISMISS, supra note 67.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at tbl.3.
75. Id. at tbls.3 & 4.
76. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 2010 Year-End Report on the Federal Judici-
ary, THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 2011, at 3.
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Figure 6 attempts to present the same information somewhat
more meaningfully by graphing, by quarter, the number of mo-
tions to dismiss filed as a percentage of the number of cases filed.
Here, however, arises the problem, implicit in the AO data, that
the motions to dismiss filed in a certain quarter were not neces-
sarily motions arising out of the cases that were filed in that
quarter. In other words, the study was likely taking apples as a
percentage of oranges.
Be that as it may, the upward-sloping fitted line suggests an
increase in the rate of filings of 12(b) motions. This rather vague
indication of a possible Iqbal-based encouragement of 12(b) mo-
tions was confirmed by the far more focused FJC Study, which
concluded that there was a statistically significant increase in the
rate of filing 12(b)(6) motions from 2006 to 2010.77
77. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 10.
630 [Vol. 46:603
20121 IQBAL'S IMPACT ON 12(B)(6) MOTIONS 631
Figure 6






Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 04 Q1 Q2 Q3
2007 2008 Year and quarter 009 2010
L I 95% confidence interval - Fitted values
* 12(b) motions filed/cases filed
Figure 7









Q1 Q2 Q3 04 Qi 02 Q3 Q4 QI Q2 Q3 Q4 Qi Q2 Q3
2007 2008 Year and Quarter 2009 2010
95% confidence interval - Fitted values
* Motions granted as percentage of motions filed
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND IAW REVIEW
Figure 7 shows a scatterplot of the granted motions to dismiss
both with and without leave to amend) as a percentage of all mo-
tions to dismiss filed, by quarter, from January 2007 to Septem-
ber 2010. Oddly, the percentage bounces down, then up, from
quarter to quarter, but stays within a range of about 34% to
about 42%. A fitted line on the data points slopes slightly upward,
possibly indicating a gradual increase in grants of 12(b) motions
from January 2007 to September 2010.
V. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FJC STUDY OF 12(B)(6)
MOTIONS
At the request of the Civil Rules Committee, the FJC under-
took an empirical study of the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on rul-
ings on 12(b)(6) motions." The FJC Study was designed to remedy
some of the deficiencies of the AO study and posed two main re-
search questions." First, the FJC evaluated whether the rate of
filing 12(b)(6) motions increased from 2006 to 2010."0 Second, the
FJC studied whether the rate of granting 12(b)(6) motions
changed from 2006 to 2010.l
I summarize the FJC's main findings below. Next, I highlight
important constraints placed on the FJC's database, many of
which were not logistically or theoretically necessary and some of
which seem likely to have resulted in an understatement of Iq-
bal's impact. Then, taking the FJC database as it is found, I com-
pare my results with the FJC's by limiting the cases in my data-
base as best I can to parallel the FJC's.
78. See Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of
the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, at 5 (June 14-15, 2010) available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ST06-2010-min.pdf, see
also REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 4 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPoli
cies/rules/Reports/STO3-2011.pdf; Lee H. Rosenthal, Pleading, for the Future: Conversa-
tions After Iqbal, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1537, 1543 (2010).
79. See Rosenthal, supra note 78, at 1543.
80. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at vii, 5, 8-9.
81. Id. at 5, 13-14.
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A. The FJC's Overall Findings
1. Rate of Filing 12(b)(6) Motions
In the first part of its study, the FJC found that 12(b)(6) mo-
tions were filed in 6.2% of all cases in 2009-2010 (after Iqbal), up
from 4.0% in 2005-2006 (before Twombly), and that this increase
in the filing rate was statistically significant at less than the 0.05
level.82 This finding confirms what was roughly apparent from the
earlier AO data in Figure 6 above.
The increased motion filing rate means higher costs for liti-
gants and more work for federal judges, without any obvious soci-
etal benefit.83 If it is true, as the FJC asserts, that there has been
no significant increase in grants of motions without leave to
amend and no significant increase in individual plaintiffs' cases
being terminated, this flurry of motion activity is not resulting in
less litigation-even assuming that less litigation is a worthy
goal.84
A recent study by Professor Lonny Hoffman also suggests that
the FJC's method of collecting cases for its database may have
been underinclusive due to search terminology and other factors."
This underinclusiveness would have applied not only to the FJC's
conclusions on the rate of motion filings, but also to its conclu-
sions on the rate of grants of motions to dismiss.
2. Rate of Different Rulings on 12(b)(6) Motions
The second part of the FJC Study is more controversial and
statistically more difficult to digest than the first part. A sum-
mary narrative that relentlessly downplays the FJC's findings on
Iqbal's impact intensifies the difficulty.
Overall, the FJC found that the rate of granting 12(b)(6) mo-
tions, at least in part, increased from 66% in 2006 to 75% in 2010
(an increase that was statistically significant at the 99% confi-
82. Id. at 8, 9 tbl.1.
83. See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 5 ("[A] higher filing rate means greater costs for
those who have to gather additional information either in anticipation of or in response to
a dismissal motion.").
84. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 16.
85. Hoffman, supra note 19, at 39.
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dence level)." It further found that an increase in the grant rate
could be seen in every major case type, including a statistically
significant increase in grants with leave to amend in contract,
civil rights, financial instruments, and "other" cases." Finally, the
FJC found an overall increase in the rate at which the grant of a
12(b)(6) motion eliminated all the claims of at least one plaintiff
(the "Termination Rate") that was statistically significant, and it
found an increase in the Termination Rate in every major case
type, even though the increase was only statistically significant in
financial instruments cases."
B. Database Limitations
Before examining the FJC's results on grant rates more closely,
it is important to understand exactly what was included in-and
more importantly, excluded from-the FJC's database. Having
done empirical work for some time now, I can attest that as care-
ful as any researcher tries to be, there are database-parameter
and coding decisions one makes at the start that at the end one
wishes had been different. This was certainly true of my study;
for example, I now wish I had coded for prisoner plaintiffs, and
for whether the "grant in part" of a mixed ruling was with or
without leave to amend. I suspect that even the FJC researchers,
with their superior resources, would have made some different
choices ex ante if they knew then what they know now.
Most critically, the FJC excluded all cases brought by pro se
plaintiffs (which constitute 29% of my database and 26% of all
civil cases in federal district court)." The FJC also excluded all
cases in which the 12(b)(6) motion was granted on the basis of
sovereign or qualified immunity (as in Iqbal itself)." Further, the
86. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 13.
87. Id. at 14 tbl.4. For a discussion of why the FJC's focus on "statistical significance"
is both partially inaccurate and substantively misleading, see Hoffman, supra note 19, at
17-21.
88. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 17 & n.33, 18 tbl.7.
89. Id. at 16; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 78 tbl.S-23 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/tables/S23Sep
10.pdf (detailing that in the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2010, 11% of all
nonprisoner cases were pro se and 94% of all prisoner cases were pro se, combining to
72,900 pro se civil cases out of a total 282,895).
90. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 41.
[Vol. 46:603634
IQBAL'S IMPACT ON 12(B)(6) MOTIONS
FJC database is limited to orders entered in two six-month peri-
ods from twenty-three of the ninety-four district courts."
Table 6 highlights the differences between my database and
the FJC's database:92
Table 6
FJC Study and Hatamyar Study Database Parameters and Coding
Database parameter FJC Hatamyar
Time period Two separate six- A five-year continuous
month periods period (May 22, 2005 to
(January to June 2006 May 18, 2010)
and January to June
2010)
Number of cases 1922 1326
Number of U.S. district 23 86
courts
Method of retrieval CM/ECF codes in 23 Electronic searches of




Pro se plaintiffs, Not included Included
including prisoner and
non-prisoner
91. Id. at 25.
92. The FJC also used a statistical model that differed from mine. First, the two stud-
ies characterized the dependent variable-the ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion-differently.
See id. at vii. Second, the FJC used as independent variables for a multinomial probit
model the years 2006 and 2010, seven major case types as indicated on the Civil Cover
Sheet, and the presence of an amended complaint. See id. at vii, 5. My independent varia-
bles for a multinomial logistic regression included the twelve circuits within which the dis-
trict courts lie, the authority cited (Conley, Twombly, or Iqbal), and thirteen case types
addressed by the 12(b)(6) motion in the actual order. My model also included as independ-
ent variables whether the plaintiff was pro se, whether a magistrate judge or a district
court judge decided the motion, and whether the case was a class action. Third, the FJC
chose to use multinomial probit rather than the multinomial logistic test that I used. See
id. at 18, 27. One authority posits that "[p]robit analysis will produce results similar to
logistic regression. The choice of probit versus logit depends largely on individual prefer-
ences." SAS Data Analysis Examples: Logit Regression, UCLA ACADEMIC TECHNOLOGY
SERVICES, http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stataldae/logit.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2011). The
FJC explains the choice of probit as justified by its method of classifying the rulings, first
as grant or deny, then if grant, by leave to amend or no leave to amend. See FJC STUDY,
supra note 16, at 15 n.28. My four ruling choices are mutually exclusive-deny in full,
mixed (grant in part, deny in part), grant the motion in full but with leave to amend, and
grant the motion in full with no leave to amend. The Small-Hsiao test of independence of
irrelevant alternatives run on these outcomes confirms that the independence of irrelevant
alternatives hypothesis is satisfied. See generally Kenneth A. Small & Cheng Hsiao, Mul-
tinomial Logit Specification Tests, 26 INT'L ECON. REV. 619 (1985).
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12(b)(6) motions Not included Included
granted on the basis of
sovereign or qualified
immunity
12(c) motions directed Not included Included
against complaint
12(b)(6) or 12(c) Not included Included
motions directed
against counterclaims




Motions decided under Included Not included
Rule 9(b) (fraud) or the
PSLRA
MDL cases Not included Included
Magistrate decisions Included Included
that appeared as part
of a district court order
or explicitly adopted by
a district court judge




Method of classifying From Civil Cover From classifying the
case type Sheet claims addressed by the
motion, as described in
the order reviewed.
Method of classifying First, whether denied Classification into one of
ruling on 12(b)(6) or granted at least in four mutually exclusive
motion part; then, if granted categories: denial of
at least in part, entire motion; granted in
whether leave to part and denied in part;
amend was allowed, granted in full, but with
leave to amend; or
granted in full, without
leave to amend.
Method of classifying Whether the case Whether a grant without
ultimate effect on terminated within 30, leave to amend resulted
plaintiffs 60, or 90 days after an in a dismissal of the
order granting a entire case.
motion at least in
part; and whether the
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1. Time Period Covered
The FJC database only includes orders deciding 12(b)(6) mo-
tions from January through June 2006, and then from January
through June 2010." The researchers explain their choice of 2006
in that this period predates Twombly and their choice of 2010 as
allowing enough time to pass after Iqbal so the district courts
would have had "interpretation of [Iqbal] by the courts of ap-
peals."
However, the limitation to a six-month period in each of the
two years is not explained (although it is likely due simply to time
and resource constraints). My own database ends on May 18,
2010, so the cases from 2010 suffer whatever first-half-year bias
there might be, although my cases otherwise run continuously
from May 2005 to May 2010.
The AO's studies show that the filing rate of 12(b) motions var-
ies by quarter.15 To get a sense of whether there was any differ-
ence in rulings between the first and second halves of the year, I
looked at the rate of 12(b)(6) motions denied by the six-month pe-
riods from 2006 to 2009 in my database, and obtained the follow-
ing results:
Figure 8













0 10 20 30 40
Percentage of motions denied in full
N=684. Includes represented plaintiffs only (no pro se).
93. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 5.
94. Id. at 2, 36.
95. See supra Figure 5.
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This suggests that for whatever reason, the rate of denial of
12(b)(6) motions in the first half of the year is not necessarily the
same, or even changing in the same direction, as the rate in the
second half of the year. Overall, looking at the cases with repre-
sented plaintiffs in the full calendar years of 2006, 2007, 2008,
and 2009, the rate for the denial of 12(b)(6) motions in the first
half of the year (January to June) was 29%, while the denial rate
in the second half of the year (July to December) was 25%. This
means that the grant rate in the second half of the year was
higher overall between 2006 and 2009, but the difference was not
statistically significant at the 95% level. It does, however, raise
the possibility that in its use of cases in the first half of the year,
the FJC's grant rate is understated.
2. District Courts Covered
The FJC study is limited to twenty-three of ninety-four district
courts." The authors explain that they chose the D.C. district,
plus the two districts in the eleven other circuits "with the largest
number of civil cases filed in 2009."" In some cases they "were
unable to obtain access to some of the courts' codes necessary to
identify all of the relevant motions," and in such cases, they chose
the court in the circuit "with the next greatest number of civil fil-
ings."8 It is not explained whether it is possible that the twenty-
three districts with the largest civil caseload might not be fully
representative of all ninety-four districts. However, the FJC ex-
plains that "[t]hese 23 district courts account for 51% of all feder-
al civil cases filed during this period,"" so the limitation to twen-
ty-three may not be important.
3. Orders Retrieved
The FJC database included all orders found through its com-
puter searches of the electronic docket records of the twenty-three
district courts listed-which would include both orders reported
in publicly available legal databases like Westlaw and Lexis and
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orders not reported in any publicly searchable legal database."oo
At several points, the FJC postulates that its ability to access or-
ders that were not contained in Westlaw and Lexis could account
for its findings showing a more modest impact of Iqbal as com-
pared with previously published studies (including mine) that
were forced to rely solely on Westlaw or Lexis.o'0 The underlying
premise is that orders granting motions to dismiss are more like-
ly to be published than orders denying motions to dismiss, so that
a study relying solely on Westlaw may overstate the grant rate.
My results below, as compared to the FJC's, do not support this
hypothesis."o0
4. Pro se and Prisoner Cases
The FJC gives two reasons for excluding pro se cases: first, that
pro se cases are "governed by standards other than Twombly and
Iqbal," and second, that the researchers were afraid their method
of retrieving orders would miss pro se cases."o
I cannot comment on the second reason. But as to the first, it is
not true that pro se cases are governed by standards other than
Twombly and Iqbal.104 The court in every pro se case in my data-
base applied Conley, Twombly, or Iqbal (depending on the time
period) or by definition I would have excluded the case. It is true
that the Supreme Court has stated that pro se pleadings should
be treated leniently, but the Court has never articulated a differ-
ent standard for pro se pleadings."' Additionally, it is unclear
how the "lenient" standard actually differs from the standard for
represented plaiatiffs, because the "lenient" proposition has often
been supported by a citation to the "no set of facts" standard of
Conley.o' Frequently, a court will repeat the "leniency" mantra
right before granting the motion to dismiss--often without leave
to amend.o' Moreover, despite the supposed leniency given pro se
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2, 5, 21.
102. Compare infra Table 7, with FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 22.
103. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 6 n.10.
104. See, e.g., Swienkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) ("Rule 8(a)'s sim-
plified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions.").
105. See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 10 & n.7 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam).
106. See, e.g., Rowe, 449 U.S. at 9-10; Kerner, 404 U.S. at 520-21.
107. E.g., Mosher v. Keanster, No. H-08-2105, 2010 WL 1484728, at *1, *3 (S.D. Tex.
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pleadings, many courts also caution that "'[pro se] status does not
exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural
and substantive law,"'o. and many courts do not even mention the
need to be lenient. 09
The FJC further states that prisoner cases were excluded "be-
cause of the distinctive characteristics and procedural require-
ments of such litigation, and because they were concentrated in
only 4 of the 23 districts included in this study.""0 I assume that
the referenced "procedural requirements" include district courts'
sua sponte review of prisoner complaints under the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act ("PLRA")"' and of complaints submitted with an
application to proceed in forma pauperis.112 I excluded such cases
as well, leaving in my database the still substantial number of
prisoner cases that were decided on a defendant's 12(b)(6) motion.
As to the concentration of prisoner cases in four districts, the
FJC's statistical methods were designed to control for differences
in districts and case types, so the necessity of this limitation is
unclear."'
Apr. 12, 2010); Powell ex rel. CP v. Helen Ross McNabb Home Base Program, No. 3:09-CV-
171, 2010 WL 419989, at *2, *5 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 29, 2010); Caldwell v. Gutman, Mintz,
Baker & Sonnenfeldt, P.C., 701 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344, 346, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Britton v.
Woodford, No. S-04-0472 LKK GGHP, 2006 WL 278579, at *3-6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2006);
Doherty v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 375 F. Supp. 2d 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
108. Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d
592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Feller v. Indymac
Mortg. Servs., No. 09-5720RJB, 2010 WL 1331066, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 31, 2010) ("The
Court recognizes that the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter, but warns that friv-
olous arguments, unsupported by legal authority are a drain on judicial resources and [do]
nothing to advance any legitimate claims she may have. Additionally, she is obligated un-
der [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)] to make claims that are supported by law.").
109. See, e.g., Tillio v. Spiess, No. 111276, 2011 WL 3346787, at *1 (3d Cir. Aug. 4,
2011) (applying Rule 8(a) and affirming dismissal of pro se plaintiffs complaint without
leave to amend); Madrueno v. Homecomings Fin. Co., No. CV-09-1413-PHX-DGC, 2010
WL 1654150, at *1, *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 21, 2010); Adams v. Litton Loan, No. CV F 10-0512
LJO DLB, 2010 WL 1444527, at *1, *4, *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2010); Schlager v. Beard, No.
09-1231, 2010 WL 1337734, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2010); Kreit v. Corrado, No. H-05-
0564, 2006 WL 2709239, at *1-3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2006); Bockenstedt v. Dimon, No. 05-
MC-58.LRR, 2006 WL 2078198, at *1 (N.D. Iowa July 24, 2006); Wimberly v. Powers, No.
6:05-cv-41 (WLS), 2006 WL 1096276, at *1, *3 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 24, 2006); Withers v. Frank-
lin Cnty. Sheriff, No. 2:05CV0028, 2005 WL 1378828, at *1, *3 (S.D. Ohio June 8, 2005).
110. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 6 n.10.
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
113. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at vii.
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5. Defense of Sovereign or Qualified Immunity
It is startling that the FJC "excluded cases in which motions
were granted on the basis of sovereign or qualified immunity,
which [the FJC] regarded as a jurisdictional issue and which was
usually raised as an affirmative defense.""' Since Iqbal itself in-
volved a 12(b)(6) motion that raised the defense of qualified im-
munity,"' the FJC's decision to exclude such cases arguably ex-
cludes the very cases that are most like Iqbal.
Moreover, the legal explanation the FJC offers for the exclu-
sion-that sovereign or qualified immunity is "jurisdictional" and
usually raised as an affirmative defense-is somewhat inaccu-
rate. As stated in a leading treatise on federal procedure,
"[A]ffirmative defenses that have been considered on a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) include ... a wide range of forms of
legal immunity from suit.""6 This proposition is supported by a
compendium of federal cases that ruled on the defense of either
sovereign or qualified immunity via a 12(b)(6) motion."7 The au-
thors of this treatise further note that while a defense of sover-
eign immunity is often said to raise an issue of subject matter ju-
risdiction to be addressed by a 12(b)(1) motion, the "great weight
of authority adjudicates qualified immunity from constitutional
torts under Rule 12(b)(6).""5 It should also be noted that I did not
include in my database any motions that were decided under
Rule 12(b)(1).
6. 12(c) Motions Directed to Complaints
The standard for evaluating a defendant's motion for judgment
on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is the same as for a 12(b)(6)
114. Id. at 41.
115. 556 U.S. -_, , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942-43 (2009).
116. 5B CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1357 & n.76 (3d ed. 2004).
117. Id. at § 1357 n.76. For a recent example, see Vance v. Rumsfeld, Nos. 10-1687, 10-
2442, 2011 WL 3437511, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2011).
118. WRIGHT & MILLER supra note 116, at § 1357 n.76 (discussing the holding and
analysis in Robbins v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (D. Wyo. 2003)); see
Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 224, 229-31 (4th Cir. 1997); see also State
Emps. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 77 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating 'leg-
islative immunity is not a jurisdictional bar" while not deciding whether sovereign immun-
ity was a matter of subject matter jurisdiction).
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motion,"9 yet the FJC only included 12(b)(6) motions."' The ex-
clusion of cases involving 12(c) motions may be related to the
search terms the FJC used.'
7. 12(b)(6) Motions Directed to Counterclaims
Similarly, the standard for evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion di-
rected to a counterclaim is exactly the same as for such a motion
directed to a complaint. 2 2 Therefore, it is unclear why the FJC ex-
cluded such cases. However, I cannot say whether the FJC's ex-
clusion of either 12(c) motions directed to complaints or 12(b)(6)
motions directed to counterclaims is important, because I did not
code my cases to distinguish between these different procedural
postures. Anecdotally, the number of such cases is relatively
small.
8. Securities and Other Fraud Cases
Conversely, the FJC included securities cases and fraud cases
in its database, which are, in fact, governed by a different-
theoretically higher-standard than Rule 8(a)(2).123 The FJC
Study indicates that its database contains 68 securities cases and
48 fraud cases-a total of 116 cases (6%) of the 1922 in the data-
base.124 Thus, the net effect, if any, of the theoretically higher
pleading standard of the PSLRA or Rule 9(b) on the FJC's results
is probably small. In addition, I have argued that Iqbal's inter-
pretation of Rule 8(a)(2) is indistinguishable from the pleading
119. E.g., Ades & Berg Grp. Investors v. Breeden (In re Ades & Berg Grp. Investors),
550 F.3d 240, 243 n.4 (2d Cir. 2008); Guidry v. Am. Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180
(5th Cir. 2007).
120. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at vii. Unfortunately, my search terms for cases under
Iqbal inadvertently excluded "12(c)," although cases deciding 12(c) motions were still
turned up by the search and included in the database.
121. See id. at 5 n.9.
122. See, e.g., Tyco Fire Prods. v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 895-97 (E.D. Pa.
2011).
123. See FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 39 tbl.B-2. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ("A
pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .") (emphasis added), with FED. R.
Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring that the party "state with particularity the circumstances constitut-
ing fraud or mistake"), and 15 U.S.C. § 78U-4(b)(1)-(2) (2006) (requiring pleading with
particularity in private securities fraud actions).
124. FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 39-40.
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standard of the PSLRA.m' Despite these points, it is possible that
the FJC's inclusion of PSLRA and Rule 9(b) cases in its database
may have slightly inflated the percentage of.12(b)(6) motions
granted over that which would have been obtained by including
only cases decided under Rule 8(a)(2).
C. Comparative Results
1. Overall Rate of Rulings on Motions
Table 7 attempts to compare the overall results of the two stud-
ies. For the calculations in my database, I removed all pro se
plaintiffs and limited the cases to those decided only in 2006 and
2010.
Table 7
Comparison of Ruling Rates (and Frequencies) in FJC and Hatamyar Studies
2006 and 2010
FJC Study Hatamyar
2006 2010 2006 2010
Grant all relief sought by 36% 46%* 38% 48%**
motion (251) (562) (57) (81)
Grant some relief sought by 30% 29% 28% 25%
motion (210) (354) (42) (42)
Denied 34% 25%* 34% 27%
(239) (305) (50) (46
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
(700) (1221) (149) (169)
Notes: Represented plaintiffs only. The FJC figures include only orders entered
in 23 districts from January through June 2006 and January through June
2010. The Hatamyar figures include orders entered in 86 districts in all of cal-
endar year 2006 and from January through May 18, 2010. Frequency numbers
for the FJC Study were extrapolated from data at pp. 13-14 of the FJC Study.
* Change in rate from 2006 to 2010 is significant at p < 0.01.
** Change in rate from 2006 to 2010 is significant at p < 0.05.
Overall, as shown in Table 7, when looking at represented
plaintiffs only, the two studies are close in their overall percent-
125. Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 577-79.
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ages. First, even when the plaintiff was represented, both studies
found a significant increase from 2006 to 2010 in the percentage
of 12(b)(6) motions granted at least in part-from 66% to 75% in
the FJC Study, and from 66% to 73% in my study. Second, both
studies found that 12(b)(6) motions were denied in 34% of cases in
2006 in which the plaintiff was represented by counsel. Finally,
both studies show a ten-percentage-point increase from 2006 to
2010 in the rate of granting all relief sought by the motion, and
the increase in rates is statistically significant at the 95% level in
both studies. In both studies, though, the increase is caused pri-
marily by increases in the granting of motions with leave to
amend.
a. Implications for the Representativeness of Computerized
Legal Databases such as Westlaw
On another issue of interest to many researchers, a comparison
of the FJC's and my results may shed some light on the debate as
to whether orders reported in Westlaw fairly represent the "uni-
verse" of orders. My database included only cases reported in
Westlaw, and the FJC's database included cases gleaned from the
courts' electronic filing records. Yet both studies found the same
percentage-34%-of motions denied in 2006. These results tend
to weaken the hypothesis advanced by the FJC that published
cases are more likely to report the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss than unpublished cases. Further, in 2010, the percentage
of motions granted at least in part (in cases with represented
plaintiffs) was actually higher in the FJC study (75%) than in my
study (73%), which was based solely -on cases reported in
Westlaw. This is the opposite of what one would predict if grants
of 12(b)(6) motions were more likely to be published than denials.
Other than my own work in this paper that suggests the oppo-
site, I am not aware of any evidence that orders ruling on 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss in computerized databases are more likely to
grant than deny the motion, and the notion seems speculative.
While there have been studies regarding the publishing of sum-
mary judgment orders, it is not clear that such results can be ap-
plied uncritically to the 12(b)(6) context. 126
126. See FJC STUDY, supra note 16, at 2 n.5.
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I remain unconvinced even as to the theory of why published
orders might more likely be grants than denials of 12(b)(6) mo-
tions. This argument assumes, first, that someone (it is not clear
who) makes a conscious decision about whether to publish each
order, and second, that whoever that someone is would rather
have orders granting motions be published. Assuming that
"someone" is a busy judge or her clerk, the first assumption seems
unrealistic, and the second is by no means obvious. The second
assumption appears to be that a judge might wish to discourage
nonmeritorious lawsuits by showing that she will not hesitate to
grant 12(b)(6) motions. But just the opposite motivation may be
true: the judge may want to discourage the filing of work-making
12(b)(6) motions and therefore prefer to publish denials of 12(b)(6)
motions. Finally, even assuming arguendo that grants are pub-
lished more frequently than denials, this would presumably have
been true under both Conley and Iqbal. Thus, it is far from self-
evident that looking only to published cases would overstate an
increase in grants.
b. Expanding the Time Period
As noted, the results in Table 7 above only include cases decid-
ed in 2006 and 2010. When I include all the cases in my database
that were decided under Conley and Iqbal-even continuing to
exclude pro se cases-my results, as shown in Table 8, for Iqbal
(but not for Conley) diverge more significantly from the FJC's.
This is because the cases in my database under Iqbal run for a
full year (from May 19, 2009 to May 18, 2010), whereas the FJC's
cases run only for six months (from January to June 2010).127
127. See id. at 36.
2012]1 645
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Table 8
Comparison of Ruling Rates (and Frequencies) in FJC (January to June 2006
and January to June 2010) and Hatamyar (May 2005 to May 2007 and May
2009 to May 2010)
FJC Study Hata yar
January to January to Conley (May Iqbal (May
June 2006 June 2010 2005 to May 2009 to May
2007) 2010)
Grant all 36% 46%* 37% 53%**
relief (251) (562) (113) (172)
sought by
motion
Grant some 30% 29% 30% 25%
relief (210) (354) (93) (83)
sought by
motion
Denied 34% 25%* 33% 22%**
(239) (305) (100) (72)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
(700) 1221) (306) (327)
Notes: Represented plaintiffs only. Frequencies for some of FJC categories ex-
trapolated from data on pages 13-14 of the FJC Study.
* Change in rate from 2006 to 2010 is significant at p < 0.01.
** Change in rate from Conley to Iqbal is significant at p < 0.01.
When looking at all of the cases decided under Conley or Iqbal
involving represented plaintiffs (not just those decided in 2006
and 2010), the rate of granting a 12(b)(6) motion in full (with and
without leave to amend) increased from 37% under Conley to 53%
under Iqbal. The comparable increase in Table 7 above was from
38% in 2006 to 48% in 2010. The difference is due largely to the
fact that in my database, the grant rates with leave to amend un-
der Iqbal in the latter half of 2009 (which were not included in
the FJC Study) were much higher than the grant rates with leave
to amend under Iqbal in the first half of 2010, as shown in Table
9.
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Table 9
Ruling Frequencies and Rates under Iqbal in 2009 and 2010
(Hatamyar database)
I Year
Ruling I 2009 2010 1 Total
-- - --------------------- ---- +--------------
Deny I 26 46 I 72
I 16.46% 27.22%* I 22.02%
------------------------------------------------
Mixed I 41 42 I 83
I 25.95% 24.85% I 25.38%
-+-------------------------------+-------------
Grant amend I 39 27 1 66
1 24.68% 15.98%** I 20.18%
-- - ----------------------------- +-------------
Grant no amend I 52 54 I 106
1 32.91% 31.95% I 32.42%
-------------+-- ---- -  -------- +-------------
Total 1 158 169 I 327
1 100% 100% 1 100%
Notes: Represented plaintiffs only. All cases decided under Iqbal. The 2009 cases
run from May 19 to December 31, 2009. The 2010 cases run from January 1,
2010 to May 18, 2010.
* Change in rate from 2009 to 2010 is significant at p < 0.01.
** Change in rate from 2009 to 2010 is significant at p < 0.05.
In the cases in my database, the rate of granting 12(b)(6) mo-
tions under Iqbal with leave to amend fell from 2009 (25%) to
2010 (16%). The rate of denying such motions under Iqbal corre-
spondingly increased from 2009 (16%) to 2010 (27%). One could
speculate that district courts overread Iqbal in 2009, and after re-
ceiving "appellate court guidance," backed off in 2010.128 One
could also speculate that the differences between 2009 and 2010
are a reflection of the normal fluctuation in ruling rates between
the first and second halves of the year. Additionally, there could
be some other explanation or combination of explanations.
128. Id.
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2. Termination of All of a Plaintiffs Claims or of the Entire Case
The FJC examined in two manners whether grants of 12(b)(6)
motions actually terminate cases or individual plaintiffs. First
the FJC "examined the percentage of cases that terminated af-
ter ... 90 days following an order granting all or some of the re-
lief requested by the motion to dismiss.""' It is not clear how the
FJC determined that an individual case in its database had been
terminated-presumably, it looked at the docket sheets. Nor is it
clear whether the case was terminated because of the grant of the
12(b)(6) motion (most cases terminate because they are settled).
And if an order only granted "some of the relief requested by the
motion to dismiss," a termination of the case within ninety days
could not have been due to the granting of the motion to dismiss
at issue, because that order would have left part of the case pend-
ing.
In any event, the FJC found that the rate of termination ninety
days after an order granting all or some of the relief requested by
a motion to dismiss rose from 34.2% in 2006 to 37.7% in 2010, but
the increase was not statistically significant."' In its "Executive
Summary," the FJC Study characterizes this finding: "There was
no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which a grant of a
motion to dismiss terminated the case.""' This is a bit misleading,
because there was, after all, an increase; it was apparently just
not statistically significant. Further, it appears that these figures
included terminations after the partial grant of a motion-which,
again, by definition could not have been terminations due to the
partial grant. It would have been more meaningful for the FJC to
present Termination Rates solely for cases in which the orders
granted the 12(b)(6) motion in full.
129. Id. at 16.
130. Id. at 16 tbl.6.
131. Id. at vii.
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Second, the FJC "explored the possibility that, when granted,
motions to dismiss may be more likely to exclude all claims by
one or more plaintiffs, even if the litigation continues with claims
by other plaintiffs."13 2 It found that "in 2010, approximately 31%
of the orders granting motions to dismiss appeared to eliminate
all claims by one or more plaintiffs from the litigation, compared
with approximately 23% of such orders in 2006," and that this 8%
increase was statistically significant.' 3 In addition, the FJC found
that the rate of granting motions to dismiss eliminating all claims
by at least one plaintiff increased in all six case types.' In con-
tract cases, the rate of eliminating all claims by at least one
plaintiff increased from 20.5% in 2006 to 25.7% in 2010; in tort
cases, from 20.0% in 2006 to 24.5% in 2010; in civil rights cases,
from 25.1% in 2006 to 29.1% in 2010; in employment discrimina-
tion cases, from 15.8% in 2006 to 26.9% in 2010; in financial in-
strument cases, from 17.6% in 2006 to 43.4% in 2010; and in
"other" cases, from 22.4% in 2006 to 28.2% in 2010.13
Despite this across-the-board increase in the Termination Rate
from 2006 to 2010, the FJC reported that the rate increase was
statistically significant only in financial instrument cases and in
total.136 None of these increases in the Termination Rate, even the
ones noted as statistically significant, were reported in the "Ex-
ecutive Summary."' 7 The "Discussion and Conclusion" section
stated, again somewhat misleadingly in light of the earlier find-
ings, "We also found no increase in the rate at which motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim eliminated plaintiffs in other
types of cases [other than financial instrument cases]."'" In fair-
ness, the latter statement appears in the context of a paragraph
132. Id. at 17. The FJC described the methodology as follows: "In those instances in
which the court granted at least some of the relief requested by the motion, we also coded
whether the plaintiff was allowed to amend the complaint, and whether the motion elimi-
nated only some claims or all claims of one or more plaintiffs." Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 17 tbl.7. The FJC noted, "These figures include the effects of orders granted
both with and without leave to amend the complaint." Id. at 17 n.33. In addition, because
of difficulties interpreting some orders, the researchers assumed that "granting a motion
as to all claims by a plaintiff would terminate the plaintiffs role in the litigation unless
the plaintiff was permitted to amend the complaint. As a result, our analysis may overes-
timate the number of cases in which an order eliminates all claims by a plaintiff." Id.
134. Id. at 18 tbl.7.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 18 tbl.7, 19.
137. See id. at vii.
138. Id. at 21.
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summarizing the results of a multinomial probit model to control
for factors other than Iqbal that might have affected the increase
in Termination Rates. Taken literally and out of context, howev-
er, it contradicts the earlier findings.
My method of classifying the termination of cases due to the
grant of a 12(b)(6) motion varied from the FJC's. Instead of trying
to determine whether an order eliminated all claims by at least
one plaintiff, I determined whether the grant-in-full of a 12(b)(6)
motion without leave to amend resulted in or contributed to the
dismissal of the entire case. This included cases in which the case
was entirely dismissed as a combination of the granting of a
12(b)(6) motion and some other motion, such as a summary
judgment motion.
Despite the differences in methodology, I also found a statisti-
cally significant increase in the Termination Rate from Conley to
Iqbal.' Even limiting my database to represented plaintiffs, as
done by the FJC, there is still a significant increase in the Termi-
nation Rate from 52% under Conley to 72% under Iqbal."'
Further, a logistic regression to control for factors other than
Iqbal that might affect the Termination Rate-excluding pro se
cases-continues to indicate that Iqbal significantly increased the
odds of whether a case was entirely dismissed upon the grant of a
12(b)(6) motion. This is shown in Table 10.
139. See supra Section III(E).
140. Of 92 cases under Conley with represented plaintiffs in which the court granted
the 12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend, 48 cases or 52% were entirely dismissed. Of
106 cases under Iqbal with represented plaintiffs in which the court granted the 12(b)(6)
motion without leave to amend, 76 cases or 72% were entirely dismissed. This increase in
the Termination Rate was significant at p 5 0.01.
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Table 10
Logistic Regression of Factors on Whether a Case was Entirely Dismissed
(Includes Only Cases with Represented Plaintiffs in which the
Motion Was Granted in Full Without Leave to Amend)
Case dism'd I Odds Ratio Std. Err. z p
---------+- - - - -----------------------------------
Twombly I 0.94 0.31 -0.20 0.843
Iqbal I 2.55 0.89 2.75 0.006*
Judge type I 0.63 0.45 -0.65 0.513
Class action I 3.89 2.21 2.39 0.017*
First Cir I 0.69 0.65 -0.39 0.695
Second Cir I 0.90 0.75 -0.13 0.895
Third Cir I 0.60 0.51 -0.60 0.551
Fourth Cir I 0.28 0.25 -1.43 0.154
Fifth Cir I 0.48 0.41 -0.85 0.394
Sixth Cir I 0.36 0.29 -1.25 0.211
Seventh Cir I 0.28 0.25 -1.41 0.160
Eighth Cir I 0.21 0.20 -1.61 0.108
Ninth Cir I 0.70 0.59 -0.42 0.674
Tenth Cir I 0.12 0.11 -2.22 0.026*
D.C. Cir I 1.20 1.16 0.19 0.850
Tort I 0.23 0.13 -2.61 0.009*
Intell prop I 0.74 0.58 -0.39 0.697
Const civ rtsl 1.15 0.52 0.30 0.764
Title VII I 1.49 1.27 0.46 0.644
ADA/ADEA 1 0.60 0.48 -0.64 0.520
Other civ rtsl 0.50 0.37 -0.94 0.348
ERISA/FLSA 1 1.17 0.73 0.25 0.806
LMRA/oth lab 1 1.70 1.41 0.64 0.524
Consum creditl 0.96 0.62 -0.07 0.944
RICO I 0.78 0.82 -0.23 0.816
Othr statutesl 0.63 0.30 -0.98 0.329
* Significant at the 95% confidence level or higher.
Notes: Number of observations = 292. No pro se cases were included. The de-
pendent variable is whether the case was entirely dismissed upon the motion's
grant (no part of the case remained pending). The independent variables are as
shown in the left column. For binary variables, non-class actions and district
court judges were the reference categories. For indicator variables, district
courts in the Eleventh Circuit were used as the reference category for Circuit
and contract cases were used as the reference category for Case Type. Antitrust
cases (only 3 observations) were dropped from the model. For this model, LR
chi2(26) = 56.93; p < 0.001; Log likelihood = -170.29; and Pseudo R2 = 0.14.
Looking only at cases with represented plaintiffs, in which the
court granted a 12(b)(6) motion in full without leave to amend,
the odds of the case being entirely dismissed were 2.55 times
higher under Iqbal than Conley. At a 95% confidence level, these
odds could be as low as 1.31 or as high as 4.97.
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VI. CONCLUSION
My earlier critical reading of Iqbal reveals my disagreement
with several aspects of that decision and provides a theoretical
basis for predicting that it would make the grant of 12(b)(6) mo-
tions more common. 4' I fear that Iqbal is another brick in the
wall blocking access to civil justice and jury trial. The wall is tak-
ing shape with increased use of summary judgment, 42 restrictive
class action interpretations, 4 3 the approval of mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses, " a parsimonious attitude towards plaintiffs' attor-
ney's fees,14' skepticism towards plaintiffs' expert witnesses,146
widespread remittitur,'4 ' a deep antipathy towards punitive dam-
ages,48 federal preemption of state-law tort claims,' and a seem-
ingly inexorable flood of so-called "tort reform" measures."'o This
litany of procedural barriers to civil justice brings to mind Repre-
sentative John Dingell's prophetic comment in 1983: "I'll let you
141. See Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 575-83.
142. E.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); see also, e.g., Richard
L. Steagall, The Recent Explosion in Summary Judgments Entered by the Federal Courts
Has Eliminated the Jury from the Judicial Power, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 469, 469 (2009) (chron-
icling the decline in the amount of federal civil cases tried); Suja A. Thomas, The Unconsti-
tutionality of Summary Judgment: A Status Report, 93 IOwA L. REV. 1613, 1614, 1616-17
(2008) (discussing federal courts' use of motions to dismiss cases prior to trial).
143. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
144. E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744, 1753 (2011).
145. E.g., Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1669 (2010); see also Nat'l
Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 769 (2011) (Scalia., J., concurring)
("And oh yes, the fact that a losing defendant will be liable not only for damages but also
for attorney's fees under § 1988 will greatly encourage lawyers to sue, and defendants-for
whom no safe harbor can be found in the many words of today's opinion-to settle. This
plaintiffs claim has failed today, but the Court makes a generous gift to the plaintiffs
bar.").
146. E.g., Alicia Gallegos, Expert Witnesses on Trial, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS (Aug.
1, 2011), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2011/08/01/prsa0801.htm.
147. E.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAw & RULES § 5501(c) (Consol. 2009) (explaining that a
court must determine that a damages award is "excessive" if it "deviates materially from
what would be reasonable compensation"); see Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518
U.S. 415, 420 (1996) (quoting N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW & RULES § 5501(c) in the federal district
court review of a jury verdict for the plaintiff).
148. E.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 500-03 (2008); State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423-24 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 584-85 (1996).
149. E.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011).
150. E.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Effect of "Tort Reform" on Tort Case Filings, 43
VAL. U. L. REV. 559, 589-60 (2009).
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write the substance on a statute and you let me write the proce-
dure, and I'll screw you every time.""'
Though my viewpoint is transparent, anyone can follow the
methods used for this study and attempt to replicate or disprove
my results. An important principle in scientific inquiry is that an
independent researcher be able to replicate a test. In Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court recog-
nized this as one of the factors a court should consider in deciding
whether a scientific opinion is reliable enough to be admissible in
evidence.' But an independent researcher cannot attempt to rep-
licate the FJC's results because she does not have unfettered ac-
cess to the federal district courts' electronic filing systems.
I have no doubt that the FJC Study was expertly and meticu-
lously performed. But let us not overlook the fact that it was con-
ceived by and completed at the direction of-although not directly
performed by-federal judges. I respectfully suggest that in at-
tempting to study what they themselves are doing, they may not
be completely impartial.'
Still, it is relatively early in the courts' process of digesting the
"deeply inscrutable" Iqbal.'54 Perhaps, even though this study in-
dicates that 1qbal has likely contributed to increased grants of
12(b)(6), Iqbal's effect pales in comparison to a host of other un-
quantifiable factors.
151. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983)
(statement of Rep. John Dingell).
152. 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) ("[A] key question to be answered in determining wheth-
er a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be
whether it can be (and has been) tested.").
153. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 477 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (exploring that one rationale for diversity jurisdiction is that "[n]o man ought cer-
tainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least
interest or bias").
154. See Mark Moller, Procedure's Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 645 (2011). Indeed, the
Supreme Court itself may have recently signaled a softening of Twombly and Iqbal (or at
least, guerrilla warfare by the dissenters in those cases). In a 6-3 decision by Justice Gins-
berg, who dissented in Twombly and Iqbal, the Court reversed the district court's grant of
a 12(b)(6) motion in a § 1983 case brought by a Texas prisoner seeking exculpatory DNA
testing. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011) ("[T]he question below was ...
whether his complaint was sufficient to cross the federal court's threshold, see
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 .... Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure generally requires only a plausible 'short and plain' statement of the
plaintiff's claim .... ). Note the Court's approving citation of Swierkiewicz, which many
had thought implicitly overruled by Twombly and Iqbal. Id.
2012]1 653
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
More fundamentally, neither this study nor the FJC Study an-
swers the merits question: Does the elevated rate of granting
12(b)(6) motions under Iqbal happen mainly in those cases where
it "should" happen? I cannot make a normative judgment here as
to whether the cases that were entirely dismissed on the grant of
a 12(b)(6) motion under Iqbal were "cases that should be allowed
to go forward as a matter of right.""' It seems doubtful that they
were all "frivolous," but without studying each case in detail I do
not know. For the moment, one addition to the "remarkable vol-
ume and intensity of the response" to Iqball56 is that claims in the
year following that decision were dismissed at a significantly
higher rate than they were before Twombly.
155. Epstein, supra note 4, at 205.
156. Rosenthal, supra note 78, at 1537.
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Appendix A
Frequency and percentage of case types in database
under Conley and Iqbal
1. All plaintiffs
Case type I Conley Iqbal I Total
------------+---- ----------------------
Contract I 56 62 I 118
I 12.61% 13.48%1 13.05%
-4----------------------------------------------
Tort I 72 39 I 111
| 16.22% 8.48%1 12.28%
-+---------------------------------------------
Intell prop I 11 15 I 26
I 2.48% 3.26%1 2.88%
-----------------------------------------------
Const civ rt I 141 124 1 265
I 31.76% 26.96%1 29.31%
------------------------------------------------
Title VII I 24 33 I 57
I 5.41% 7.17%1 6.31%
-4----------------------------------------------
ADA/ADEA I 15 8 | 23
I 3.38% 1.74%1 2.54%
-+-------------------------------------------
Other civ rt 1 10 27 I 37
I 2.25% 5.87%1 4.09%
------------------------------------------------
ERISA/FLSA | 19 31 I 50
| 4.28% 6.74%l 5.53%
------------------------------------------------
LMRA/oth lab | 8 7 I 15
1 1.80% 1.52%1 1.66%
----------------------------------+ --- --- --
Antitrust | 2 6 I 8
I 0.45% 1.30%1 0.88%
-4----------------------------------------------
Cons credit I 17 35 I 52
I 3.83% 7.61%1 5.75%
---------------------------------- +--------------
RICO 1 8 8 I 16
I 1.80% 1.74%1 1.77%
-4--------------------------------+--------------
Other statutes 61 65 I 126
I 13.74% 14.13%| 13.94%
-----------------------------------------------
Total 1 444 460 1 904
I 100.00% 100.00%l 100.00%
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2. Represented plaintiffs only
Case type I Conley Iqbal Total
---+-- --------------------------------------
Contract I 48 60 108
I 15.69% 18.35%I 17.06%
---+-- --------------------------------------
Tort 66 33 99
I 21.57% 10.09%I 15.64%
---+-- --------------------------------------
Intell prop 9 15 24
I 2.94% 4.59%1 3.79%
---+-- --------------------------------------
Const civ rt 1 62 53 1 115
I 20.26% 16.21%I 18.17%
---+-- --------------------------------------
Title VII I 11 18 1 29
| 3.59% 5.50%1 4.58%
---+-- --------------------------------------
ADA/ADEA I 8 6 1 14
I 2.61% 1.83%1 2.21%
---+-- --------------------------------------
Other civ rt I 6 12 1 18
| 1.96% 3.67%1 2.84%
---+-- --------------------------------------
ERISA/FLSA | 19 30 1 49
I 6.21% 9.17%1 7.74%
---+-- --------------------------------------
LMRA/oth lab 1 8 6 1 14
I 2.61% 1.83%1 2.21%
-----------------------------------------------
Antitrust 126 I 108
1 0.65% 1.83%1 1.26%
-------------------------------+-- - - - - ----
Cons credit 1 14 22 I 36
1 4.58% 6.73%1 5.69%
-----------------------------------------------
RICO 1 7 7 I 14
1 2.29% 2.14%1 2.21%
-------------------------------+-- - - - - ----
Other statutes 1 46 59 I 105
1 15.03% 18.04%l 16.59%
-----------------------------------------------
Total 6 306 327 I 633
100.00% 100.00%l 100.00%
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3. Pro se plaintiffs only
Case type I Conley Iqbal I Total
----- -- --- --- --- -------+ - -
Contract I 4 2 I 6
I 3.10% 1.50%1 2.29%
--------- ---------- -- -- -- -- -- -----------
Tort I 6 6 I 12
I 4.65% 4.51%1 4.58%
--------------------------------------------
Intell prop I 2 0 | 2
I 1.55% 0.00%1 0.76%
----------------------------------------------
Const civ rt I 78 71 I 149
I 60.47% 53.38%1 56.87%
------------------------------+ -- -- -- --
Title VII I 12 15 1 27
I 9.30% 11.28%1 10.31%
-+---------------------------------------------
ADA/ADEA I 6 2 1 8
I 4.65% 1.50%1 3.05%
---- ---- ---- - ----------------------------
Other civ rt 1 4 15 I 19
I 3.10% 11.28%I 7.25%
-+---------------------------------------------
ERISA/FLSA I 0 1 1 1
1 0.00% 0.75%1 0.38%
- --- +-- ------------ -------------------
LMRA/otb lab I 0 1 1 1
I 0.00% 0.75%1 0.38%
-----------------------------+ -- -- -- --
Cons credit I 2 13 I 15
I 1.55% 9.77%1 5.73%
----------------------------------------------
RICO 1 1 1 1 2
I 0.78% 0.75%l 0.76%
------------------------------+ -- -- -- -
Other statutes I 14 6 I 20
I 10.85% 4.51%1 7.63%
---------------------------------------------
Total I 129 133 I 262
I 100.00% 100.00%l 100.00%
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